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COMMENTS
WISCONSIN STRIVES TO MINIMIZE CONFLICTS
OVER THE USE OF WATER*
INTRODUCTION
Wisconsin's development and growth is inextricably tied to
the abundance of her water resources. Recently, however, the
increasing demands placed upon that resource base by indus-
try, municipalities and recreational users have resulted in inev-
itable conflicts. In an effort to minimize these conflicts, the
laws which affect the use of disposition of water in Wisconsin
have changed dramatically in the past few years.' These com-
mon law and statutory changes have had and will have a pro-
found impact on shaping Wisconsin's development and growth.
Representative of that change are two recent decisions of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court which fashioned new rules of law
pertaining to the use and disposition of ground water and dif-
fused surface water. This article will explore the court's ration-
ale and add some perspective on the impact of the court's
holdings.
* Material for this article forms a portion of a much larger report which is entitled
WATER LAW IN SOUTHEASTERN WISCONSIN, TECHNICAL REPORT #2 (2nd ed.), which is
being published by the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission. The
author gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance provided by the Commission
and its permission to publish segments of that report.
1. Cf. Wis. STAT. § 147.01 et seq. (1973) which requires a permit system for all
pollutant discharges into the state waters; §§ 144.26, 59.971 and 87.30 which require
the zoning of shorelands and floodplains; and §§ 15.347(8), 20.285(1), 20.3705(e) and
(em) and ch. 33, which authorize a program to rehabilitate Wisconsin's inland lakes.
Also see the Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions of Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7,
201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) which upheld the state's right under the public trust doctrine
to regulate development in the floodplains, and Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 218
N.W.2d 734 (1974), where the court held that diversions from non-navigable streams
required a permit under Wis. STAT. § 30.18 (1973). Moreover, the federal government
has also taken great strides in this area to regulate certain activities which may impact
on the nation's waters. See, Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (Supp. I1, 1973), the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (Supp. I1, 1973), the Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1451 et seq. (Supp. I1, 1973); the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4001 et seq. (Supp. 111, 1973), and the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f et
seq. (Supp. I, 1975).
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I. CONFRONTATION WITH AN ARCHAIC RULE FOR GROUND
WATER: THE SETTING
2
In the case of State v. Michels Pipeline Construction Inc,
3
(henceforth Michels) the supreme court was confronted with an
old rule of law established in the much criticized case of Huber
v. Merkel,4 which permitted the possessor of land to use with
impunity the captured waters found beneath the surface.5 The
challenge to that doctrine and the election by the court to
afford specific protection to certain users of ground water arose
over the following circumstances.
Michels Pipeline Construction Inc. had contracted with the
Metropolitan Sewage Commission of Milwaukee to install a
five foot diameter sewer line beneath the Root River Parkway,
Greenfield, Wisconsin. The county had granted a twenty foot
construction easement to the Sewerage Commission for the
specific purpose of constructing the sewer line. All three parties
were joined as defendants in the action brought by the State.'
Constructing or installing sewer lines such as that involved
in Michels necessitates tunneling, sometimes at rather . sub-
stantial depths. In this instance the depth was forty feet. A
frequent result of such tunneling is pressure or inward push of
groundwater which attempts to fill the new void. Conse-
quently, a practice known as dewatering occurs during the con-
struction period. This involves lowering the groundwater level
by pumping water from wells. The problem of water inflow is
eliminated, thereby hastening the trenching and installation
process, and reducing the costs of construction. The effects of
this dewatering process, however, are not confined to the wa-
ters immediately along the course of the tunnel. There is also
2. The following discussion is directed at percolating ground water and not to
underground streams in definable channels. Percolating waters are defined as "those
which ooze, seep, filter, or percolate through the ground under the surface, without a
definite channel, or in a course that is uncertain or unknown," 56 AM. JUR. Waters §
111 (1956). However, the presumption as to the nature of underground waters is that
they are percolating and the burden of establishing that a permanent channel exists
falls on the persons asserting it. 93 C.J.S., Waters § 87 (1956).
3. 63 Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339 and 219 N.W.2d 308 (1974).
4. 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W.2d 354 (1903).
5. Although the court in Huber did not distinguish between percolating and arte-
sian waters, this is not the general rule. Cf. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 92 (1956), which states
that the rule vesting the ownership of percolating waters in the owner of the land does
not apply to the waters of an artesian basin underlying the lands of several owners.
6. They were joined in addition by the Metropolitan Sewerage District of the
County of Milwaukee and Sewerage Commission of the City of Milwaukee.
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a drawdown in adjacent wells in the surrounding area which
may cause dry wells, or a decrease in capacity or quality of
water, and in some instances the result may be a subsidence
of soil.
In the Michels case the State alleged that a number of
citizens in the area had in fact suffered these injuries as a direct
result of defendant Michels Pipeline pumping ground water at
a rate of 5,500 gallons per minute to dewater the soil to a depth
sufficient for tunneling. The relief sought by the State, how-
ever, was not abatement of the project, but rather diminution
of the injuries. The State's argument was that there would be
costs generated regardless of the course of action pursued by
the defendants, and that higher costs resulting from different
construction techniques should be absorbed by all persons ben-
efiting from the system, rather than the present practice which
effectively placed the costs upon a few adjacent landowners.
The trial court, adhering to the existing rule of law enunci-
ated in Huber, found that the State of Wisconsin's complaint
did not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action.7
Thus, the court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
"there was no cause of action on the part of an injured person
concerning his water table."'
The State appealed from the lower court's dismissal, and
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed two substantive
issues. The first concerned whether a public nuisance in fact
existed. If none did, the supreme court would sustain the lower
court's decision. The respondents argued that on the basis of
the nature and scope of conduct and its consequences no public
nuisance existed The supreme court felt otherwise. It reiter-
ated the statements of State v. H. Samuels Co., stating:
... [I]f the public is injured in its civil or property rights
or privileges or in respect to public health to any degree that
is sufficient to constitute a public nuisance; the degree of
7. 63 Wis. 2d at 282, 217 N.W.2d at 340. The defendants had demurred to the
complaint and the demurrer was granted.
8. Id. The doctrine found in Huber had been reaffirmed in the companion cases of
Fond du Lac v. Empire, 273 Wis. 333, 77 N.W.2d 699 (1956), and Menne v. Fond du
Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 77 N.W.2d 703 (1956).
9. In Brief for Respondent at 10, it was pointed out that from the State's complaint
it could not be determined whether the injury alleged impacted on 2,200 or 24,000
people.
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harm goes to whether or not the nuisance should be en-
joined.'"
The court added that "The public does not have to include all
the persons of the community but only a sufficiently large
nu mber of persons, as alleged here."'" Thus, the court found
the requirements for a public nuisance satisfied by the allega-
tion that the neighborhood surrounding the sewer project had
been adversely affected by the dewatering.
Having resolved that issue, the court addressed the major
issue of the case-whether the facts were adequate to consti-
tute a cause of action. Acceptance of the State's position would
necessitate overruling Huber. In weighing the consequences of
such a decision, the court examined the rationale of the Huber
doctrine.
The basis of the English or common law rule that gives
absolute ownership to the captor of percolating ground water
was that the forces controlling the movement of underground
water were too mysterious and unpredictable. As a result, it
was much easier and more practical to fashion a rule of abso-
lute possession with no liability for injury, rather than attempt
to regulate an unknown entity. The effect was to preclude a
cause of action for interference with ground water.
But in Michels, the court took judicial notice of the fact
that advancements in the scientific community, specifically in
the field of hydrology, had rendered the Huber position
archaic. The court emphasized that water systems are interde-
pendent and that sophisticated means are available to measure
the impact of drawing upon underground water and the effect
it has on the water table." Moreover, it added, there is little
justification for considering rights in ground water absolute,
while rights in surface streams are subject to a doctrine of
reasonable use. 3 As a result, the court felt compelled to over-
rule Huber."
10. 60 Wis. 2d 631, 638, 211 N.W.2d 417, 420 (1973) and 63 Wis. 2d at 288, 217
N.W.2d at 343.
11. 63 Wis. 2d at 288, 217 N.W.2d at 343.
12. Id. at 292, 217 N.W.2d at 345.
13. Id.
14. Id. Establishing that a scientific base did in fact exist, the court also addressed
the issue of stare decisis, but found that it was "not an inflexible restraint, but merely
a cautionary rule." Id. at 294, 217 N.W.2d 346; and specifically it found no law requir-
ing that the doctrine "must be adhered to wherever a change would affect property
rights." (emphasis in original) Id. at 296, 217 N.W.2d at 347. And, in deflating the
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The supreme court analyzed several doctrines as potential
replacements for the Huber rule. To better understand the
American Rule, which was finally adopted, it is helpful to fol-
low the court's analysis and balancing of the respective Merits
of each against what it felt were interests of Wisconsin.
A. The English Rule or Common-Law Rule of Absolute
Ownership
Under this doctrine the landowner has complete freedom to
draw upon the underground water at will, and the owner need
not apportion the water among competing users, or use it bene-
ficially. The rule of law is stated as follows:
It is based on the premise that ground water is the absolute
property of the owner of the freehold, like the rocks, soil and
minerals which compose it, so that he is free to withdraw it
at will and to do with it as he pleases, regardless of the effect
the withdrawal may have upon his neighbors.'5
The only exception to the rule is liability if withdrawal was
motivated by malicious intent.
B. Reasonable Use Doctrine
In Corpus Juris Secundum, from which the court quoted
directly, the reasonable use doctrine is defined as follows:
• ..limiting the right of a landowner to percolating water in
his land to such an amount of water as may be necessary for
some useful or beneficial purpose in connection with the land
from which it is taken, not restricting his right to use the
water for any useful purpose on his own land, and not restrict-
ing his right to use it elsewhere in the absence of proof of
injury to adjoining landowners."6
The term reasonable as used in this context, however, has a
argument that the change in the law should be made by the legislature, the justices
pointed out that "this court has made dramatic changes in common law rules even
though earlier cases had refused to do so saying such change was up to the legislature.
Id. at 294, 217 N.W.2d at 346. It added that such a change affecting property (here
ground water) was not a taking but merely bringing this in line with limitation placed
on other property. Id. at 296, 217 N.W.2d at 347.
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Explanatory Notes § 858A, at 153 (Tent.
Draft No. 17, 1971), which also states that the landowner overlying the groundwater
may sell and grant his right to withdraw the water to others; and 93 C.J.S. Waters §
93(c)(3) (1956).
16. 63 Wis. 2d at 299, 217 N.W.2d at 349; 93 C.J.S. Waters § 93(c)(3).
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very limited meaning.' If the water withdrawn is used in
connection with the overlying land it is a reasonable use, even
if harm is caused. Only a wasteful use of water that actually
causes harm is unreasonable. Furthermore, the transporting of
water for beneficial use on lands other than that overlying the
source is unreasonable only if it causes harm. 8 The practical
effect of the rule, as pointed out by the court in Michels, is that
it:
only affords protection from cities withdrawing large
quantities of water for municipal utilities. . . .However,
under the rule there is no apportionment of water as between
adjoining landowners, [therefore] . ..the rule gives partial
protection to small wells against cities or water companies,
but not protection from a large factory or apartment building
on the neighboring land.'"
C. Correlative Rights Doctrine
This doctrine provides apportionment of underground
water. Each owner's share is determined by the amount of
water available that may be reasonably used under the circum-
stances. It differs from the reasonable use doctrine in that the
landowner is only entitled to a reasonable share if there is not
enough to supply all."0 The doctrine is summarized in Corpus
Juris Secundum as follows:
Those rights of all landowners over a common basin saturated
strata, or underground reservoir are coequal or correlative,
and one cannot extract more than his share of the water, even
for use on his own land, where others' rights are injured
thereby."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court found such a rule not appro-
priate for two reasons. First, water conditions within Wisconsin
are not so limited as to require the apportionment. Secondly,
the administrative machinery is not available to adequately
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 15, at 153.
18. The court provided an example where "[o]ne may sink a well for domestic use
or other use on his land without liability to his neighbors for effects on their wells as
long as he acts without malice and is not wasting water to their detriment." 63 Wis.
2d at 301, 217 N.W.2d at 350.
19. Id., and see ELLIS, WATER-USE AND ADMINISTRATION IN WISCONSIN § 5.04 at 91
(1970).
20. 93 C.J.S. Waters § 93(c)(4) (1956).
21. Id.
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apportion the resource."2 The court, not satisfied with the three
doctrines discussed above, adopted instead the rule found in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.2
D. The American Rule
In adopting this principle, the supreme court reiterated the
Reporter's analysis. It is important to note the distinction be-
tween the new rule and the reasonable use doctrine.24 The
Michels rule broadens and extends the protections of the old
rule against harm caused by large withdrawals for operations
on overlying lands as well as water used elsewhere. 5 The
Restatement (Second) of Torts section reads as follows:
SEC. 858A. NON-LIABILITY FOR USE OF GROUND WATER-
EXCEPTIONS.
A possessor of land or his grantee who withdraws ground
water from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose is not
subject to liability for interference with the use of water by
another, unless
(a) the withdrawal of water causes unreasonable harm
through lowering the water table or reducing artesian
pressure,
(b) the ground water forms an underground stream, in
which case the rules-stated in secs. 850A to 857 are
applicable, or
(c) the withdrawal of water has a direct and substantial
effect upon the water of a watercourse or lake, in which
case the rules stated in secs. 850A to 857 are appli-
cable.
The presumption of the rule, therefore, is that ground water
remains plentiful and that a privilege exists to use the waters
beneath the land. But this privilege does not represent an un-
qualified property right in ground waters.27 The focus then
22. 63 Wis. 2d at 300, 217 N.W.2d at 349.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 858A, pp. 151-162 (Tent. Draft No. 17,
1971).
24. Notes 16-18, supra.
25. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS supra note 15, at 155.
26. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 858A (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
27. The court's position has been reaffirmed in the more recent case of Village of
Sussex v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 68 Wis. 2d 187, 197, 228 N.W.2d 173, 179 (1975).
There the court upheld the D.N.R.'s authority to order the village to cap certain
contaminated wells and construct a public water supply under Wis. STAT. §
144.025(2)(r) (1973). It found that denying the use of potentially contaminated wells
to the owners did not constitute a "taking" since the denial was exercised under the
police power and not eminent domain.
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shifts to the problem of allocating costs when injury occurs,
e.g., deepening prior wells, installing pumps, paying increased
pumping costs, etc.2 Under the common law of Huber, these
added costs were borne by each user, while under the reasona-
ble use rule and its narrow interpretation, persons using exist-
ing wells were protected only if the water was taken off the land
for use at another location. Application of the newly adopted
rule follows the reasonable use doctrine which applies to sur-
face streams, that is the traditional meaning of reasonable use
in determining who shall bear the burden of costs. Comments
by the Reporter of Restatement (Second) of Torts indicate:
• . . it is usually reasonable to give equal treatment to per-
sons similarly situated and to subject each to similar bur-
dens. . . . The choice of where to place the burden may de-
pend upon the relative position of the parties and their capac-
ity to bear the burden. Later users with superior economic
capacities should not be allowed to impose costs upon smaller
water users that are beyond their economic reach. 29
An example supplied by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
and the court illustrating the mechanics of the process is where
a farmer sinks a well which initially is sufficient for irrigation
but subsequently becomes inadequate because other farmers
are using ground water from the same source for irrigation. The
cost for deepening the first farmer's well (i.e., the prior user)
under the new rule would be assumed by the first farmer, since
in this instance all the farmers are in a similar situation. On
the other hand, a municipality's use of the ground water for
domestic purposes, or another farmer using it for stock water-
ing, may well constitute an unreasonable use, thereby placing
the liability on them as subsequent users. Thus, the utilization
of underground water for wholly new purposes will subject the
new user to liability if the prior users suffer injury.
Although not specifically addressed in the case, the Re-
porter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicates that a
corresponding liability will attach to the new user if the magni-
tude of withdrawal appreciably differs from that of the prior
user.
3 0
28. 63 Wis. 2d at 303, 217 N.W.2d at 351.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858A comment d at 158 (Tent. Draft No.
17, 1971) and also quoted in Michels, 63 Wis. 2d at 302, 217 N.W.2d at 350.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 29, at 159.
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On a motion for rehearing it was decided that the American
Rule would be applied prospectively except as to the parties in
Michels and a companion case. Thus, liability for actions aris-
ing under the new rule would commence as of May 7, 1974.1
E. Perspective
Given the paucity during the past seventy years of legal
actions involving situations such as that presented in Michels
(only three cases including this one reached the supreme
court), the decision to expressly overrule Huber is significant.
It may have been a much more simplified process if the private
nuisance action had been allowed and the state had not been
involved (the private parties involved in Michels were readily
identifiable and their injuries were relatively easy to discern).
Instead, it is apparent the Wisconsin Supreme Court, as in
other recent decisions, has shown a willingness to initiate or
actively support efforts that seek to protect one of the state's
most valuable resources.2
A result of the decision may be a dampening effect on im-
provements of this type. But, if the result is greater precautions
and adequate planning initiated prior to construction (such as
providing an alternative source of water), then it will be a
notable achievement. Internalizing the costs will result in
higher construction costs, but with proper calculations, there
will be a more equitable sharing of the costs by those who
actually benefit from the improvements.
An important caveat to the new American Rule should be
recognized. The court's rejection of the correlative rights doc-
trine and apportionment, on the basis that ground water condi-
tions in Wisconsin are adequate, may be rather short sighted
if current patterns prevail. While it is true that apportionment
of water is a practice found for the most part only in the arid
western states, increasing demands for water, especially in
southeastern Wisconsin, may substantially tax the existing
supply beyond its recharge capacity. Increased consumption by
industry, nuclear power plants in the cooling processes, and
domestic water use contribute heavily to this depletion. The
31. 63 Wis. 2d at 303a-303b, 219 N.W.2d at 309.
32. See materials cited, supra note 1 and also Village of Sussex v. Dept. of Natural
Resources, 68 Wis. 2d 187, 228 N.W.2d 175 (1975), where the court reaffirmed its
position in Michels.
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American Rule is designed to compensate for such uses if they
are deviants from the norm, but when the source for all practi-
cal purposes is no longer available a totally different problem,
not covered by the rule, emerges. Also, users similarly situated
will not receive compensation. The cumulative effect of many
small users, all for the same purpose, may have the same result
as the major consumers, but in this situation compensation will
not be forthcoming. Regulations and restrictions on use supple-
mented with allocation programs according to some defined
criteria may well be the only answer, and present law does not
meet that possibility.
HI. DIFFUSED SURFACE WATER LAW: THE ABANDONMENT OF THE
COMMON ENEMY DOCTRINE
Another recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
follows and solidifies the court's position in Michels on the
importance of the state's water resources base. This second
opinion deals specifically with diffused surface water law, and
attempts to minimize the conflicts that arise over the use of
those waters. 3 This area of water law has assumed added sig-
nificance as increased developmental activity changes and re-
shapes the natural terrain. In Wisconsin, extensive residential
development and new commercial districts such as shopping
centers dramatically influence local drainage patterns. The
construction of storm water drainage and flood control facilities
designed to serve and protect these new developments have
also had a marked effect. Consequently, an understanding of
the new rule adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court is im-
perative.
33. The Wisconsin court has defined different surface waters (more commonly
known as "storm waters") as: ". . . waters from rains, springs, or melting snow which
lie or flow on the surface of the earth but which do not form part of a watercourse or
lake." Thompson v. Public Service Comm., 241 Wis. 243, 248, 5 N.W.2d 769, 771
(1942). The definition was quoted by the court from the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 846,
comment b (1939). A ravine which was usually dry except in times of heavy rains or
spring freshets was held by the court not to be a watercourse, and the water in it was
held to be diffused surface water. Hoyt v. City of Hudson, 27 Wis. 656 (1871). Riparian
law which is addressed to allocation of water for use from lakes, streams, or ponds does
not apply to diffused surface water. Instead, the law that does apply deals with con-
flicts, not about water use, but about attempts to get rid of water. However where
diffused waters which flow into a watercourse and become a part of that watercourse
lose their original character and become subject to the riparian doctrine. Conversely,
waters which overflow a watercourse and "permanently escape" from that watercourse
become diffused surface waters not subject to the riparian doctrine.
[Vol. 59
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A. Reflecting On An Old Doctrine
Until late 1974 Wisconsin had followed the common enemy
doctrine in determining the propriety of interfering with dif-
fused surface waters. Basically, that rule permitted private
landowners who were seeking to improve their land to fight as
a common enemy the diffused surface water in a particular
drainage shed. Such action could be carried out regardless of
the harm caused to others as long as it did not involve tapping
a new drainage shed.34 The doctrine developed in the mid-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries primarily to facilitate
the expansionist policy of this country's development. 3 These
practices caused injury to many unfortunate landowners who
were subject to new drainage patterns, with the absence of
recovery compounding the injury.3
It is questionable that the common enemy doctrine had
merit even during the nation's developing years, and the Wis-
consin Supreme Court decided it is not a realistic rule for con-
temporary times. Thus in State v. Deetz, the court elected to
abandon the doctrine in favor of the American Law Institute's
reasonable use rule.37 The most significant aspect of this deci-
sion is the reiteration of the present court's determination to
harmonize the common law with present societal needs.3 1
B. The Specific Conduct in Question
In Deetz the State of Wisconsin brought an action against
a property developer and others to enjoin the defendants from
34. Manteufel v. Wetzel, 133 Wis. 619, 114 N.W. 91 (1907); Watters v. National
Drive-In, 266 Wis. 432, 63 N.W.2d 708 (1954).
35. State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). The court at 14-15 dis-
cussed the origins of the rule as documented in an article written by Kinyon and
McClure, Interference With Surface Waters, 24 MiNN. L. REv. 891 (1970).
36. Shaw v. Ward, 131 Wis. 646, 658, 111 N.W. 671, 675 (1907). The court here
found that in defending against surface waters the landowners may rid their land of
surface water by natural or artificial means "[i]f consequential damages, from the
exercise of such right, occur . . . [to others], they are remediless except by the
exercise of the same right, so far as conditions render that feasible, upon their own
premises."
37. 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974). The "reasonable use" rule is found in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 et. seq. (Tent. Draft No. 17,1971). RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972), presented to the A.L.I. in May, 1972,
reported that the material in No. 17 had been approved in principle.
38. The court went so far as to say: ". . . [O]ur conclusion is consistent, perhaps
mandated, by our decision in State v. Michels Pipeline Construction, Inc. (1974), 63
Wis. 2d 278, 217 N.W.2d 339, 219 N.W.2d 308." 66 Wis. 2d at 18, 224 N.W.2d at 416
(1974).
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permitting the deposit of material on an adjacent road and in
Lake Wisconsin. The state also sought forfeitures from the de-
fendants under Wisconsin Statute sections 30.15(1) and
30.15(3) which provide for penalties for unlawful obstruction of
navigable waters.39
The Deetz's and other individuals had purchased lands on
a bluff overlooking Lake Wisconsin, and had developed the
lands for residential use. Prior to this development, the lands
had been primarily used for agricultural purposes, with mini-
mal erosion and runoff. The residential development, however,
created a substantial increase in the amount of soil carried
from the bluff by diffused surface waters. The result, according
to testimony at the trial, was that sand deltas of 6,000 square
feet and 8,000 square feet were formed in the lake, and the road
at the base of the bluff was covered by sand, at some points up
to eight inches deep.
Evidence produced at the trial also showed that the public
was no longer able to use the lake for boating, fishing, or swim-
ming, and that vegetation had commenced growing in the
silted areas. Furthermore, the evidence firmly established a
direct link between the construction of the roads at the new
residential development on top of the bluff and the subsequent
increase in surface water runoff and formation of the deltas in
the lake.
The property owners who lived at the base of the bluff had
complained to Deetz about the runoff and siltation, but he
stated that there was nothing he could do about the problem.
Consequently, the State of Wisconsin brought a public nuis-
ance action to abate the disposal of surface waters."
C. The Subsidiary Issues
In addition to public nuisance, the State also argued in a
separate action that the results of the development activity
were violative of the statutes previously mentioned, as well as
Wisconsin Statute section 29.29(3). The latter prohibits the
deposit of deleterious substances on ice or waters within the
state.4'
39. Wis. STAT. § 30.15 (1973) provides for a $50 forfeiture for every offense, with
each day being considered a separate violation.
40. The action was brought under Wis. STAT. § 280.02 (1975), which provides that
an injunction may be brought by the Attorney General.
41. In addition to the forfeiture, Wis. STAT. § 30.15(4) (1973), provides:
[Vol. 59
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The trial judge dismissed the State's complaint, however,
concluding that the statutes were irrelevant. The court's ra-
tionale was that the defendant had not "deposited" material
into the lake, but rather the deposit resulted from the flow of
surface water. And, since the damage resulted from the prop-
erty owner's exercise of a legally sanctioned right to fight sur-
face water, recovery was not allowed.
On appeal the supreme court addressed the application of
these statutes to the specific facts of the case. The court, in
interpreting the intent of the statutes, affirmed the trial court's
conclusion of irrelevancy. 2
Prior to discussing the major issue involved in the Deetz
case, two further points made by the Wisconsin court pertain-
ing to the statutes discussed above should be noted. The first
(4) OBSTRUCTIONS ARE PUBLIC NUISANCES. Every obstruction constructed or
maintained in or over any navigable waters of the State in violation of the
chapter and every violation of § 30.12 or 30.13 is declared to be a public nuis-
ance, and the construction thereof may be enjoined and the maintenance thereof
may be -abated by action at the suit of the state or any citizen thereof.
The State in its brief to the court, attempted to have the court read the statutes
liberally, wherever an ambiguity may have existed. By so doing, it was argued, the
injury suffered here would constitute violation of the statute. The State based its
argument for a liberal interpretation from the court's decision in Reuter v. DNR, 43
Wis. 2d 272, 168 N.W.2d 860 (1969), which found that ch. 30 of the Wisconsin Statutes
(1973) should be read in light of the legislative intent when it enacted ch. 144. The
Attorney General felt that the legislature "clearly recognized the possibility that mis-
use of natural drainage systems can cause pollution," and therefore if the court should
again analyze and read ch. 30 with the intent and purpose encompassed in ch. 144,
the violations of each of the statutes could be established. Reply Brief for State of
Wisconsin at 5, State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d 1, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
42. With respect to § 30.12, which regulates the structures and deposits in naviga-
ble waters, the critical element missing from Deetz's conduct was that he did not
deliberately fill in Lake Wisconsin. The interpretation of the statute by the court is
that it only prohibits "deliberate fills" and that indirect or unintentional deposits are
not violations of the statute. 66 Wis. 2d at 22, 224 N.W.2d at 418.
The State in its arguments at trial indicated in addition that the defendants had
violated § 29.29(3) which prohibits the depositing of deleterious substances in the
waters of the state. The supreme court, however, found that the actions of Deetz and
the other defendants were distinguishable from those found precluded by this section
of the statutes. The court found that the statute was concerned only with "the dis-
charge into navigable waters and the control of refuse arising from manufacturing
activities." 66 Wis. 2d at 23, 224 N.W.2d at 418. The court placed great reliance on
the fact that the legislature had denominated the types of contamination which consti-
tuted "deleterious substances" and that discharges of diffused surface waters into a
navigable stream was not one of the prohibited items. The court did point out, how-
ever, that the State was correct in concluding that the statute did not require wilfull-
ness on the part of the violator, and that negligence may bring the conduct within the
proscriptions of the statute.
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is that if the defendants' continuous course of conduct had in
fact violated either one or both of the statutes, then "the re-
peated violations of the criminal statutes (would have) consti-
tuted per se a public nuisance."43 Since Deetz's actions were
not covered by these statutes, however, the rule was not applic-
able. The other matter was the means by which the state may
effectively curb indirect pollution. It felt that other methods,
such as zoning and subdivision controls, were available to pre-
vent the degradation of the waters." Specifically, the court
mentioned Wisconsin Statute section 144.26 as one such mech-
anism. But the court refused to use criminal statutes to cover
indirect pollution. 5
D. Fashioning Relief from Discharges of Diffused Surface
Water
The process leading directly to the decision to overturn the
common enemy doctrine focused on nuisance law in Wisconsin
and the public trust doctrine.
As indicated above, one of the causes of action was for an
injunction to abate a public nuisance under Wisconsin Statute
section 280.02.46 It was established at trial that damages had
been sustained and were continuing from the deposit of sand
both in the lake and on the road. But the supreme court found
that the trial court judge was correct in his application of the
common enemy rule. The property owners, Deetz and the other
defendants, were exercising a legally sanctioned right in fight-
ing surface waters, and therefore a nuisance action could not
43. 66 Wis. 2d at 21, 224 N.W.2d at 417. The court was reiterating a rule previously
handed down in State v. H. Samuels Co., 60 Wis. 2d 631, 637, 211 N.W.2d 417, 420
(1973).
44. The supreme court made reference to an article by Jon Kusler, Water Quality
Protection for Inland Lands in Wisconsin: A Comprehensive Approach to Water
Pollution, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 35, which discusses the use of local flood plain and
shoreland zoning ordinances to cope with indirect sources of pollution. 66 Wis. 2d at
23, 224 N.W.2d at 418.
45. The State did not allege in its complaint or on appeal of the Deetz case that
regulations adopted under § 144.26 were at issue.
46. This statute is strictly construed as to who may bring such actions. The inter-
pretative commentary on § 280.01 discussing nuisance states:
The act of omission which is the basis of either a public or private nuisance is:
(1) an intentional tort, (2) negligence or (3) an act of omission for which there
is absolute liability. A public nuisance is an offense against the state, while a
private nuisance is a tort to a private person. The same act may constitute both
a private and a public nuisance.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 280.01 (1958).
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be maintained.4 7 In an effort to circumvent this bar to its com-
plaint, the State argued that there was a cause of action per se
arising from the public trust doctrine. Basically, the State's
reasoning was that the interference with navigable waters, here
the formation of sand deltas, was a violation of the public's
legal rights in the waters, thereby meeting the requisite ele-
ments for a cause of action. The Wisconsin court did not agree,
concluding that the public trust doctrine merely gives the state
standing as trustee to vindicate any rights that are infringed
upon by existing law.4" In other words, the State would be a
proper party to bring such an action as alleged here, but merely
gaining access to the court was not enough. Legal liability for
unlawful acts arising out of either the statutes or case law must
also be established, and since the common enemy rule still
governed, a cause of action could not be maintained.
As a last resort in this many faceted argument, the State
placed in issue the usefulness of the common enemy doctrine
itself. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, finding that the doctrine
no longer comported with the realities of contemporary society,
agreed.
E. Adopting the "Reasonable Use" Rule for Diffused Surface
Waters
Having decided to overrule the common enemy rule, the
court, as it had in Michels, went to the Restatement (Second)
of Torts for the new reasonable use rule.49 Section 822 of the
Tentative Draft Number 18 incorporates damages occasioned
by surface waters, and the language adopted by the court reads
as follows:
One is subject to liability as a result of the non-trespassory
invasion when the invasion is either
47. On the appeal the supreme court pointed out:
Although the defendants do not dispute that a public nuisance would have been
created if the disposal of the surface waters constituted a tortious act, their
argument is that they committed no wrong because they were acting within the
rights of a landowner seeking to cope with surface water.
66 Wis. 2d at 8, 224 N.W.2d at 411.
48. Id. at 11, 224 N.W.2d at 412. The court did, however, provide a short synopsis
on the doctrine indicating its great flexibility, pointing out, for example, that it may
be used both by citizens and by the State either to limit certain state action or else to
prevent it from taking place. It may also be used affirmatively as where the doctrine
formed the cornerstone in the legislative enactment to regulate the shorelands and
floodplains of the state.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
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(a) intentional and unreasonable, or
(b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the
principles controlling liability for negligent or reckless
conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or ac-
tivities. 0
The Wisconsin Supreme Court emphasized that the new rule
would apply to public and private nuisances. 1
The critical determination of fact centers on the unreasona-
bleness of the intentional act. The methodology in making that
determination is set out below.
F. The Process of Determining the Unreasonableness of
Invasion
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides for the follow-
ing:
SEC. 826 UNREASONABLENESS OF INVASION
An intentional invasion of another's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land is unreasonable under the rule stated in
sec. 822,52 if
50. Id. Intentional invasions are defined in § 825 of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
(1939):
An invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land is inten-
tional when the actor:
(a) acts for the purpose of causing it; or
(b) knows that it is resulting or is substantially certain to result from
his conduct.
The reporters of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS indicate that it is the mere knowledge
which goes to proving intent; the invasion need not be inspired by malice. See com-
ment a to § 825.
In distinguishing § 822(a) from § 822(b), the reporters point out that in determining
the reasonableness of unintentional invasions "it is the risk of harm which makes the
conduct unreasonable." When the harm is intended, on the other hand, it is necessary
to look only at the gravity of the harm which was suffered. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 822, comment k at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
51. 66 Wis. 2d at 16, 224 N.W.2d at 415, and found in comment a to § 822 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
52. The reporters in Tentative Draft No. 17 envision the following broad test in the
analysis of whether actions are unreasonable:
The question is not whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's or defendant's
position would regard the invasion as unreasonable, but whether reasonable
persons generally, looking at the whole situation impartially and objectively,
would consider it unreasonable. Regard must be had not only for the interests
of the person harmed but also for the interests of the actor and for the interests
of the community as a whole.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, comment c at 34 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971).
§§ 827 and 828 discussed in the main text provide the factors for this deliberation.
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(a) the gravity of the harm outweighs the utility of the
actor's conduct, or
(b) the harm caused by the conduct is substantial and
the financial burden of compensating for this and other
harms does not render infeasible the continuation of the
conduct. 3
The factors involved of weighing the gravity of the harm versus
the utility of the actor's conduct, as found in section 826(a), are
charted as follows:
THE EQUATION FOR DETERMINING WHETHER THE
GRAVITY OF HARM EXCEEDS THE UTILITY OF
CONDUCT54
Factors Involved in Deter- (a) the extent of the
mining the Gravity of Harm: harm involved;"8
Sec. 827 (b) the character of
In determining the grav- the harm involved; 7
ity of the harm from an in- (c) the social value
tentional invasion of an- which the law at-
other's interest in the use and taches to the type
enjoyment of land the follow- of use of enjoyment
ing factors are important:55  invaded;"8
53. The reporters make the following distinction as between (a) and (b): "... the
formula which referred to social utility of the conduct in general, was regarded as
appropriate in a suit for injunction, but not in a damage action, which does not require
that the conduct be discontinued." Tent. Draft No. 18, supra note 50, at 3. It was a
result of this apparent dichotomy that (b) was added and further enumerated in § 829A
of the Tent. Draft No. 18 (1972), which provides that although there is utility derived
from the conduct and it should not be enjoined, the substantial harm which results
from the invasion is entitled to some compensation.
54. The Wisconsin Court in State v. Deetz, 66 Wis. 2d at 17, 18, 224 N.W.2d at
415, 416, quoted these factors as developed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826,
827, 828 (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
55. The list of factors here is not meant to be exhaustive according to the reporters
and the relative weight of each will vary depending upon the facts. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971) (Hereinafter cited § 827).
56. Comments on this clause indicate that consideration may be given to risks of
other harms that might be incurred by the complaining party. § 827, comment c at
38.
57. It was felt here that if physical damage resulted the gravity of harm would be
treated as great even though the extent of harm was small, but where the invasion
involved personal discomfort the harm is regarded as slight unless the invasion is
substantial and continuing. § 827, comment d at 39.
58. Here the test is: "How much social value a particular type of use has in com-
mon with other types of use depends upon the extent to which that type of use ad-
vances or protects the general public good." § 827, comment e at 39.
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(d) the suitability of
the particular use
or enjoyment in-
vaded to the char-
acter of the local-
ity;59
(e) the burden on the
person harmed of
avoiding the harm."
Factors Involved in Deter-
mining the Utility of Con-
duct: Sec. 828
In determining the utility
of conduct which causes an
intentional invasion of an-
other's interest in the use and
enjoyment of land, the fol-
lowing factors are impor-
tant:"l
(a) the social value
which the law at-
taches to the pri-
mary purpose of
the conduct; 2
(b) the suitability of
the conduct to the
character of the
locality;"
(c) whether it is imprac-
ticable to prevent or
avoid the invasion, if
the activity is main-
tained;64
(d) whether it is im-
practicable to main-
tain the activity if
it is required to
bear the cost of
compensation for
the invasion.65
59. The suitability of the particular use is determined as of the time of the invasion
and not when the use began, the rationale being that the character of the locality may
have significantly changed in the interval. § 827, comment f at 40.
60. The intent of this clause is "[tihat persons living in society must make a
reasonable effort to adjust their uses of land to those of their fellow men before com-
plaining that they are being unreasonably interfered with." § 827, comment g at 41.
61. The standards in measuring the utility of conduct are those present in the
community at the time and place of the conduct and in addition what the courts
themselves have regarded as the social value for certain types of human activity. It is
very important to note that: "It is only when the conduct has utility from the stand-
point of all factors that its merit is ever sufficient to outweigh the gravity of harm it
causes." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828, comment b at 42 (Tent. Draft No.
17, 1971) (Hereinafter cited § 828).
62. Primary purpose refers to the main objective of the actor in doing the act. §
828, comment c at 42.
63. I.e., the type of activity which predominates within the community. § 828,
comment f at 45.
64. An invasion would be practicably avoidable if the actor, by some means, can
substantially reduce the harm without incurring prohibitive expense or hardship. §
828, comment g at 46.
65. The court in considering this factor must not only consider the compensation
for harm in the suit before it but also potential compensation to others who may also
be injured. In this situation the reporters indicate the review is much stricter, i.e.,
corresponding to that in a suit for an injunction. § 828, comment h at 47.
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G. Application of the Rule to Deetz
In applying the new rule to the conduct of Deetz, the su-
preme court concluded that the land development activity on
the bluff overlooking Lake Wisconsin had in fact caused dam-
age to the public trust." Furthermore, since Deetz continued
the development project after having knowledge of the conse-
quences, the element of an intentional invasion was met. 7 The
next step was to evaluate the evidence from the trial record in
light of the factors in section 827. The language and qualitative
nature of the factors to be used in the weighing and balancing
process makes this a difficult task, particularly where preced-
ent is lacking. 8 Its useful, therefore, to illustrate the court's
findings in order to provide some indication of the court's un-
derstanding of what they believe is encompassed by each of the
factors.
On the evidence contained within the record, the justices
felt that the following was shown:
(a) the extent of the harm involved: Extensive deltas have
been formed, the erosion is continuing, and as the result of
the erosion and the consequent silting, portions of the lake-
front and the adjacent waters can no longer be used for swim-
ming, fishing, and boating.
(b) the character of the harm involved: The physical damage
to the lake, to the roadway, and to the below-bluff lands:
(c) the social value which the law attaches to the type of use
or enjoyment invaded: Substantial portions of the lake dedi-
cated to the public for recreational and navigational pur-
poses, uses on which the State of Wisconsin places a high
priority, have been impaired.
66. 66 Wis. 2d at 19, 224 N.W.2d at 416.
67. Id. For a definition of an intentional invasion which was not discussed by the
court except impliedly. See note 50, supra.
68. An indication of this difficulty is the fact that the Wisconsin court went to a
New Hampshire case over a century old to show where similar factors were used in
evaluating the reasonableness of conduct. But, the Wisconsin court doesn't seem to
have narrowed the focus nor does it incorporate greater specificity. The decision in
Sweet v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439, 496 (1870) held as follows:
In determining this question all the circumstances of the case would of course
be considered, and among them the nature and importance of the improvements
sought to be made, the extent of the interference with the water, and the amount
of injury done to the other land owners as compared with the value of such
improvements, and also whether such injury could or could not have been rea-
sonably foreseen.
66 Wis. 2d at 18, 224 N.W.2d at 416.
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(e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm:
The burden on the injured parties, the State of Wisconsin, as
the trustee of the public trust, and on the private landowners
to avoid the harm occasioned by the erosion is substantial.69
This evaluation, however, forms only one side of the equation
in the process of ascertaining whether Deetz's actions were rea-
sonable. While the evidence supported the State's case that
substantial harm had occurred, no evidence was available to
measure the social utility of the action because the case had
been dismissed at the trial level. Consequently, Deetz had not
been required to come forward with evidence that might estab-
lish the merits of the residential development project he had
undertaken. In recognition of this fact, the supreme court re-
manded the case to the lower court.7"
In remanding, the supreme court expounded on their inter-
pretation of the reasonable use rule. They indicated that land
development activity would still be a high priority in any eval-
uative process, as under the common enemy doctrine, but this
policy and its economic ramifications would not be given the
great weight that it had during the nineteenth century.7'
H. Considerations on Prospective Application of the
"Reasonable Use" Rule72
The distinctions made by the court place a heavy burden
on the individual arguing a private nuisance action. Although
dicta, it is a limitation on the new rule if this reasoning is
adhered to. The presumptions in favor of the social utility of
land development would weigh heavily against the injured
party's attempts for an injunction or compensation.73
69. Id. at 19, 20.
70. As of the time of this writing the proceeding had not taken place.
71. The court here specifically mentioned the case of Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis.
2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972) to reaffirm the public policies that it recognized as being
of such importance to the state and its citizens. 66 Wis. 2d at 20, 21, 224 N.W.2d at
417.
72. It should not be inferred from the following discussion that land development
per se is bad. Rather, the concern here is with the type and location of development,
neither of which may be effectively analyzed if only local norms or customs are the
guiding criteria as envisioned by this process. Also, the presumption in favor of such
action prior to even involving the evaluation process weakens it even more.
73. The question of compensation emerges from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 828, comment h at 46-7 (Tent. Draft No. 17, 1971): "Whether it is impracticable to
maintain the activity if it is required to bear the cost of compensation for the invasion."
If land development has utility, as it seemingly must given the presumption in favor
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It should be emphasized at this point that although the
decision arrived at in Deetz has the effect of removing the
substantive defense that the common enemy doctrine had pro-
vided, it does not remove other procedural or substantive de-
fenses that may exist.7 4 With this caveat in mind, the following
hypothetical situations are presented which alter the fact situ-
ation found in Deetz, and which raise certain questions con-
cerning its prospective application.
What happens, for instance, when a development is under-
taken whose primary purpose is directed to benefit the public
(for example, in the construction of a building for use by the
public which may affect the flow of surface water)? It can be
assumed that the social utility in these instances would rate
very high under normal circumstances using the present
scheme of evaluation adopted in Deetz.75 But what if the public
interest is injured as in Deetz? Following the rationale as set
out by the court in Deetz, private citizens, the state, or local
of it by the court, then following the comments by the reporters certain persons who
have less inconvenience than others (which involves another evaluative process not
discussed by them) may have to forego compensation in order to allow the land devel-
opment activity to continue. In other words the operation is not economically feasible
if it has to compensate for all the injury that it causes. Thus certain social costs or
externalities will never be internalized and such presumptions as made here may
effectively negate a true determination of what is reasonable. It should be pointed out
that such arguments may be countered by the fact that § 826(b) specifically provides
compensation for injury. See note 53, supra. For additional comment see notes 78 and
79 and accompanying text.
74. Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962) removed the gov-
ernmental immunity for tortious acts by the state or any of the local units of govern-
ment, but the court was careful to point out that a suit brought against the state for
such acts must still meet the procedural requirements set out in the statutes. The
common law in Wisconsin has been quite explicit in not allowing damages where a
municipality was involved in constructing streets, sewers and gutters, going beyond
even the "common enemy" doctrine by allowing the municipality to tap new wat-
ersheds, which affect the flow of surface waters. Cf. Peck v. Baraboo, 141 Wis. 48, 56,
122 N.W. 740 (1909) where the court said:
• * * [A] municipal corporation cannot be held in damages by a landowner for
changing the natural flow of and increasing the volume of surface water by the
construction of streets and gutters, nor because the sewer was inadequate by
reason of negligence in adopting plans in the first place, or by reason of negli-
gently failing to maintain the sewer in good working order thereafter, to carry
off the surface water so accumulating as fast as it accumulated.
And in Tiedman v. Middleton, 25 Wis. 2d 443, 452, 130 N.W.2d 783, 788 (1964), it said:
"By constructing streets and gutters within its limits, a city may change the natural
watercourse so as to increase the flow of water upon private land."
75. For example, the reporters, in commenting on clause (a) of § 828, would rate
actions with direct public benefit higher on social value than those primarily benefit-
ting the individual. § 828, comment e at 44.
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units of government could challenge the action under the pub-
lic trust doctrine in conjunction with the reasonable use rule.76
In that event, the equation for weighing the harm versus utility
of the reasonableness of the conduct may approach its most
equal balance, since the analysis would be of actions designed
to benefit the public directly versus the injury to the public
interest."
And what happens if the reverse of Deetz occurs? Where
would the heaviest burden lie? That is, where the land develop-
ment's major purpose was for the public which subsequently
causes injury only to private interests. The implication of the
reasonable use rule would seem to clearly favor the public en-
terprise. The social utility of the public development would
conceivably be rated at the upper end of the scale, but the
invasion of private interests, without the support of the public
trust arguments, would be in a weak position in attempting to
obtain injunctive relief.78
As awareness continues to increase over the short and long
term effects of private and public development, the situations
posed above can be expected to become more prevalent. The
necessity of having accurate projections based on reliable data
will become even more crucial if the newly adopted process
encompassed within the reasonable use rule is to work. One
further observation about the new rule should be noted.
The factors of social utility are basically a function of the
predominating activities or community norms. 79 This emphasis
in favor of non-deviant action prevails for the first two factors
in section 828, "(a) Social Value which the law attaches to the
primary purpose of the conduct," and "(b) Suitability of the
conduct to the character of the locality." On its face this would
76. See note, 48 supra, which discusses the court's documenting of the various
parties who may use the "trust" doctrine in fostering or precluding particular actions
affecting the public trust in waters.
77. That possibility almost presented itself in Deetz as the Town of DeKorra was
named in the complaint as a defendant, but the cause of action was dismissed from
the lawsuit when parties on both sides agreed that the town was not at fault in causing
the siltation. The issue therefore was never reached.
78. Other alternatives may be available to the party seeking redress for the dam-
ages where, for example, the injury may be so severe as to create an inverse condemna-
tion situation, and establishing that fact would entitle the injured party to receive
compensation.
79. They say, for example: "On the whole, the activities which are customary and
usual in the community have relatively greater social value than those which are not."
§ 828, comment e at 44.
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seem to be a sensible policy of maintaining the integrity of an
existing community. It may well lead, however, to continued
local entrenchment and fractionalized thinking towards devel-
opment activity. If so, this policy will only serve to exacerbate
current problems where local decision making has so often
failed to account for the external costs that accompany such
enterprises. Only in this instance it would be receiving encour-
agement from members of another branch of government-the
judiciary.
The reasonable use rule may prove difficult to apply as new
fact situations arise in the future. The variable factors encom-
passed in the new rule, while reflecting some time honored
concepts of the law, tend to be quite soft when taken on a
collective basis and subjected to a probing analysis. Hopefully,
greater reliance will be placed on economic indicators, where
possible, to give additional clarity to the effects of altering
diffused surface water patterns. And where information is
available showing the spin-off effects of the development, both
in benefits and costs to outlying communities, it should be
incorporated as a matter of course. Obviously, not all the ele-
ments of determining the social utility of conduct or the harm
of an invasion are quantifiable, but total reliance on the pres-
ent indicators or factors heavily influenced towards the status
quo may prove to be very misleading and costly.
CONCLUSION
Although neither the Michels nor Deetz decisions solve the
numerous problems which plague the areas of ground water
and diffused surface water law, they do provide an indication
that the Wisconsin Supreme Court is willing to address some
very complex issues concerning one of the states most precious
resources.
Invariably, judicial opinion which sets new precedent as
these decisions invokes much criticism and some praise. With
respect to the critics, the usual arguments are that the court
has taken the wrong tack, or that it has gone too far, or not far
enough, and while this commentary leans to the latter view it
becomes tempered with the realization that Michels and Deetz
form a portion of a much larger and significant precedent in
Wisconsin's water law. That precedent is based on a judicial
concern for maintaining the integrity of the state's water re-
sources and minimizing the conflicts over their use. The con-
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cern assumes greater clarity if the Michels and Deetz decisions
are read together and in light of other recent decisions." One
can only hope that the court will continue to pursue this course.
PETER V. McAvoy
80. Just v. Marinette, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972); Omernik v. State, 64
Wis. 2d 6, 218 N.W.2d 734 (1974).
